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China’s current social security system is largely a devel-opment from the second half of the 1990s, one thatis still under construction, and not yet complete. Pre-
1978, income maintenance (ensuring basic subsistence to the
population) was, as in other command economies, woven
into the fabric of economic organisation. The able-bodied
were expected to work and, if they were urban residents, the
government allocated them jobs, albeit very low paid. A de-
layed consequence of these guaranteed jobs was the serious
problem of a surplus labour force in the state and urban col-
lective sector, which became a major concern for the govern-
ment in the 1990s. If they were rural residents, the collective
unit of which they were a part, usually a production team, as-
signed them tasks entitling them to a share in the collective
income. This regime of “welfare through work” was comple-
mented by a policy of keeping the prices of necessities low
and the provision of relief to the rural localities struck by nat-
ural disasters or classified as endemically poor. The payment
of an allowance in cash and kind, as in means-tested social as-
sistance, was confined to a very small group characterised by
the “Three Nos”: not able to work, no savings and no rela-
tives to depend on. Government and state enterprise employ-
ees enjoyed a range of benefits, including “labour insurance”.
The rural and urban populations were then also largely sepa-
rate, very much unlike today where, because of rural-to-urban
migration and the re-designation of rural counties as urban
districts due to urbanisation, the rural and urban populations
have become much more integrated.
Notably absent from the social security arrangements were
two schemes that are common in welfare states and would
later be introduced into the Chinese social security system.
Of these two schemes an unemployment insurance scheme
was introduced in 1986 as the complement to the fixed-term
employment contracts in the state sector and generalised to
the whole of the urban labour force in 1998. The other
scheme was means-tested social assistance for all, including
those able and willing to work but without a job. Such a
scheme, termed “Minimum Living Standard Assistance”
(MLSA), is a recent innovation. The MLSA scheme, cov-
ering the urban population, was introduced in 1998 and for
the rural population in 2007. The generalisation of MLSA
to the whole urban population and the extension of Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI) to the urban labour force marked
the culmination of the growing recognition on the part of the
government that it could no longer guarantee jobs to the
urban labour force as it was able to do in the past.
The labour insurance system, which covered state sector em-
ployees and larger collective enterprises and was the precur-
sor of the present-day “social insurance”, was originally set
up in the 1950s with an administrative structure of its own
and financed by employer and employee contributions. It
was transformed into work-unit or occupational welfare dur-
ing the period of the Cultural Revolution. Over this period,
retirement was suspended; employees worked for as long as
they were physically able. Thus the reform period started
with a social security system that was partly out of operation
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As part of its plan to establish a harmonious society, the Chinese Communist Party has resolved to establish by 2020
a social security system covering both urban and rural populations. A common assumption is that the integrated
system would provide to the whole population the same high level of protection that a section of the urban population
currently enjoys. 
This article will provide an overview of the current situation and consider the prospects for the establishment of such
a system by 2020. The aim is ambitious and the time available for achieving the target is very limited. However, two of
the principal pre-conditions for achieving the target are present. First, there has been a dramatic improvement in
public finances and the trend looks likely to continue. The implication is that the government would be increasingly
capable of covering the extra cost of setting up an integrated social security system. Second, the leadership is
strongly committed to establishing such a system. Yet a seamless and fully operational system is highly unlikely.
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and comprised a disparate collection of arrangements to
cater for various contingencies. The  Current  Social  Securi tyComplex  – An Overview
The current assortment of social security schemes do not
constitute an integrated whole, hence the term “complex” is
used instead of “system”. Broadly they are aimed at the fol-
lowing:
• Poverty alleviation
• Income maintenance in the event of unemployment, occu-
pational injury, sickness and retirement
• Subsidised, including free, medical care as and when
needed.
This list raises the question of the effectiveness of these aims
at the macro level. A quantitative answer is not possible but
one can convey an idea of their scale by pointing to the lim-
its and scope of the impact of social security schemes. Con-
cerning poverty alleviation, the reform period (since 1979),
has witnessed a dramatic reduction in poverty in rural areas.
Following the distribution of land to rural households, which
started the reform process, the number of rural poor fell
from 250 million in 1978 (30.7% of the rural population) to
85 million in 1990. Much of this fall was due to output
growth, while anti-poverty schemes played a negligible role
or none at all. Arguably the three schemes, the “basic living
allowance for laid-off employees,” UI, and the MLSA
played a crucial role in preventing urban poverty. They con-
stituted an overlapping three-line defence against the urban
population slipping into poverty and became fully opera-
tional in 1997-99 as the state sector was shedding labour on
a massive scale. 
Turning to income maintenance under various contingencies,
such as unemployment and retirement, its effectiveness is
limited by the fact that less than half of the urban labour
force participates in the social insurance schemes that cater
to these contingencies. As for the subsidisation of medical
care by the rural and urban medical insurance schemes, this
has a “very limited” impact on the cost of the medical care
to patients. Faced with declining tax revenue to GDP ratio
over the first twenty or so years of the reform period, the
government sharply reduced direct subsidies to medical
care.((1) Added to this, the insurance schemes cover a small
percentage of medical care costs. As a result, by interna-
tional standards the Chinese population bears a high per-
centage of the cost of medical care and a substantial slice of
the population thus forgoes necessary medical treatment, a
figure as high as 50% according to a Ministry of Health sur-
vey (see article of Sarah Cook in this special feature).
The schemes that make up the social security complex, can
be divided into the familiar categories of “social insurance”
and “social assistance (social safety net)”.((2) Both categories
include a variety of schemes and the distinction between
them is based on two salient aspects: the conditions attached
to the provision of benefit (entitlement qualification); and
the method of financing. 
As is usual, social assistance is conditional on means testing.
However, social assistance that is free of additional condi-
tions, such as being unable to work and without close rela-
tives is a recent development. The means test in China can
be stringent and intrusive and may discourage a substantial
number of genuine cases from claiming assistance. Being
non-contributory the social assistance schemes have to be fi-
nanced from general government revenue, which, in the Chi-
nese context, leads onto the vexed issue of the apportion-
ment of expenditure responsibilities among various govern-
ment tiers. The issue has risen in importance in recent years
with the establishment of a number of new social assistance
schemes and a huge growth in the number of their benefici-
aries. Prominent examples include two schemes: the
MLSA, which was generalised in 1998, and for which the
number of beneficiaries has since risen from 1.8 million to
22.3 million in 2005;((3) and the new Rural Co-operative
Medical Insurance Schemes (RCMIS), which began to be
set up in 2003, are heavily subsidised. On 30th June 2007,
participants in RCMIS totalled 720 million, around 85% of
the rural population.((4) The dramatic increase in the number
of beneficiaries of these two schemes is due largely to the
central government covering most of the cost of the schemes
and thus circumventing the issue of the division of costs
among government tiers. 
The contributory schemes fall into two categories: social in-
surance and the two rural schemes including local pension
schemes which cover a rural population of 54 million (only
7% of the total) and provide no more than part-subsistence.
Although there is individual contribution in RCMIS, the
scheme is better regarded as a social assistance scheme be-
cause the government (central and territorial) pays 80% of
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Press.
4. China View, Xinhua Net, 5 September 2007.
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the total contribution. It is social insurance that constitutes
the core of the contributory schemes in the complex. In de-
sign, China’s social insurance system is very similar to those
of welfare states and includes five separate schemes covering
old-age pensions, injury compensation, healthcare, maternity
benefits, and unemployment compensation. Participation in
social insurance is, in principle, mandatory for the urban
labour force, which in 2005 totalled 273 million (36% of the
total labour force). But the participation percentage falls well
short of 100. In the case of the old-age pension scheme,
which covers more than the other four social insurance
schemes, the total number of contributors in 2005 was only
131 million, a mere 48% of the urban labour force. Gener-
ally, the participation rate in social insurance is high in the
state sector where formal labour contracts are common, and
low in small and medium private enterprises, where formal
labour contracts are rare. 
A major impediment to increasing participation in social in-
surance is that the number of employees has been falling in
the state sector and rising in the private sector. Migrant
workers who are one-quarter to one-third as numerous as the
urban labour force are largely outside the social insurance
umbrella. The principal barrier to the enrolment of migrant
workers is not rules and regulations but that the schemes are
ill adapted to their situations. Also outside this umbrella are
social-wage employees of town and village enterprises
(TVEs), who number 143 million compared to 62 million
employees in the state sector.((5)
An unusual feature of China’s social insurance system is a
wide variation in the number of participants in particular
schemes. This is due to the fact that the five schemes are
treated as individual schemes, not as a combined package as
they would be in a welfare state. For example, participants in
2005 numbered 131 million in the old-pension scheme, 106
million in the unemployment insurance scheme, with 106 mil-
lion and 100 million in the medical insurance scheme. The
work injury compensation scheme had only 85 million partic-
ipants.((6) Even in the case of old-age pensions the number
of participants came to 48% of the urban labour force. The
participation rate of the urban labour force also varies across
94 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
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Old people wrapped up against the cold of mid winter talking in afternoon
sunshine in one of Beijing’s remaining hutong. The old-age pension scheme
now covers more than the other four social insurance schemes
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Setting Up an Integrated Social Security System
localities; it is high in Shanghai and other coastal provinces
and low in the interior provinces. In law, participation in so-
cial insurance is mandatory for the whole urban labour force.
In practice, the participation rate is high in the state sector
and in large non-state units; and the rate is low in small units,
mostly in the service sector. As outlined earlier, a particular
impediment to the extension of social insurance is the steady
shift of employment away from the state sector into small en-
terprises in the services. 
Social insurance provides limited social security cover in that
it not only excludes, by design, non-participants in the labour
market, but also fails by a wide margin to cover the whole
urban labour force. The implication is that a social security
system has to include both social insurance and social assis-
tance schemes, if it is to cover a substantial section of the
population, which is what the Chinese and other social se-
curity systems do. The transition towards a market economy
has drastically curtailed the scope of “welfare through work”
and the void that created has been largely filled by social as-
sistance schemes. The trend looks likely to continue. Two Sal ient  Features
Taken together, the contributory and non-contributory
schemes are characterised by two salient features, ramifica-
tions of which run wide and deep throughout the system:
• Segmentation and striking differences in provision across
groups
•Highly decentralised financing and management.
Segmentation
The abiding feature of the Chinese social security complex has
been the deep division between the rural and the urban popu-
lations and the glaring contrast between their respective social
security entitlements. This division dates from the pre-reform
period (pre-1978) and still survives, though increasingly blurred
at the edges. All social security schemes are targeted at either
the urban or rural population; as yet not one covers both. The
urban population benefits from a complementary combination
of contributory social insurance, providing old-age pension,
work injury compensation, healthcare insurance, maternity ben-
efit and unemployment compensation, and means-tested social
assistance (MLSA), which bridges any shortfall of household
per capita income from the local poverty line.
In a stark contrast to the comparatively high level of social
security enjoyed by the urban population, the social security
provision for the rural population is sparse. The rural
schemes constitute a disparate combination: they date from
various periods and were established on a piecemeal basis.
Bar a few minor exceptions, they are non-contributory social
assistance schemes, aimed at alleviating severe hardship and
narrowly targeted, either on households passing a means test
or the residents of designated localities. The methods of fi-
nancing vary across schemes and the responsibility for their
supervision and operation is split between different organisa-
tions. Some are financed and managed entirely by the local
government and villages.((7) Others are jointly financed by
several government tiers. They do not form a coherent sys-
tem—hence the term “complex” rather than “system”. 
As pointed out above, the contributory (social insurance)
schemes for the rural population are few. The imbalance be-
tween the two types of scheme is due in part to the common
difficulty in collecting contributions in a rural economy
where income is only partly monetised. It is due also to the
separation of rural and urban schemes. Thus the sections of
the rural population are excluded from urban schemes even
when there is no real impediment to their participation. Of
the rural labour force of 485 million, 143 million (28%) are
employed full time in town and village enterprises
(TVEs).((8) Although a substantial percentage of them are
wage employees in sizeable enterprises, they are excluded
from social insurance simply on the basis of their designation
as “rural.” The paucity of rural contributory schemes matters
because they can serve objectives that are beyond the scope
of social assistance schemes, for example by providing a pen-
sion in old age or medical insurance without means testing.
An urban bias in social security provision is not particular to
China, being commonly seen in developing economies. The
bias is to a degree unavoidable, given serious problems in
designing contributory social security (social insurance)
schemes for the self- or the informally employed. It occurs
even in developed economies. There are two professed ra-
tionales for the limited social protection cover in China’s
rural areas. One is that each rural household is assigned a
plot of agricultural land that serves as a floor to household
income, a feature that is particular to China and a few other
economies. The other is the high cost of introducing a social
security regime comparable to the one in urban areas, rela-
tive to the limited capacity to collect taxes and social secu-
rity contributions in rural areas. Both are valid justifications,
95N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
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qualified as “administrative” when it refers to the former.
8. NBS (State Statistical Bureau), 2006b, China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2006, Beijing.
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but only under strong qualifications. The protection provided
by land plots is highly variable and has diminished over time
because of the combination of the increase in the rural pop-
ulation and the diversion of land to non-farm uses. The lat-
ter has given rise to a substantial rural population without
any land. As for the second, the rural-urban distinction is
maintained even where it is possible to extend some
schemes to the rural population. For example, 143 million
employees of TVEs are excluded from social insurance,
even when employed in large enterprises on terms similar to
those in urban enterprises. The differing treatment of the
urban and rural populations is also based on the anachronis-
tic assumption that the rural labour force is self-employed
and engaged in farming. For the purposes of social security,
the terms “rural” and “urban” are defined with reference to
the entry in the hukou (ID register), not the actual place of
residence. As a result persons living and working in cities on
a long-term basis may still be classified as “rural” and ex-
cluded from the schemes for the urban population. From the
point of view of social security, the population is divided
along two lines: first, rural and urban, and second, perma-
nent residents and immigrants, a distinction which is mainly
relevant in an urban setting. In the past, there also existed a
deep division between the state sector employees and other
employees, which has almost disappeared. The first two di-
visions are fading, but will still take some time to disappear
completely. The ubiquitous hukou, “ID registration”, which
was first introduced in the 1950s still survives, though mod-
ified. It records personal details and resembles the national
identity card schemes in many European countries, except
in one crucial respect. That is, the permanent place of resi-
dence in the ID register can only be altered by administra-
tive discretion and does not change with migration. Thus
hukou partakes of a central feature of citizenship and is sim-
ilarly used to control migration or to sort individuals into cat-
egories with differing entitlements. Following a lowering of
impediments to travel and labour mobility and the displace-
ment of rationing with an open market in necessities, migra-
tion grew and became substantial in the 1990s. As a result,
the hukou has mutated into a mechanism for dividing the
population into “permanent residents” and “outsiders” (mi-
grants) with differing access to social goods, such as basic
education, and opportunities in the labour market. The mi-
grant population((9) is huge—just over 134 million according
to the 2000 population census, around 11% of the then na-
tional population.((10) In the Chinese context, the category
“migrants” is an anomaly created by treating individuals as
residents of a locality other than where they have actually
been living and working for a long time. With a large per-
centage excluded from participation in social insurance and
means-tested social assistance, the migrant population repre-
sents a huge blind spot in the social security cover.
Decentra lisation
Both rural and urban social security systems are highly de-
centralised, the former more than the latter. In the case of
the urban schemes, although social insurance and MLSA
are based on regulations issued by the central government,
many of the details of the schemes are left to the discretion
of the provincial or municipal governments. More conse-
quential, for both social insurance and MLSA the budget-
ary units are 269 cities (excluding county-level cities and
towns);((11) and generally cities are expected to cover from
their own budgets any deficit on social insurance and the
cost of MLSA in their respective jurisdictions. In some
cities, such as Chengdu, the budgetary unit is not the city it-
self but its constituent units, districts. As is to be expected,
the balance between contributions and expenditure varies
across cities, depending on, for example, the number of pen-
sioners relative to contributors and the unemployment rate,
and so do their general finances. As a result, the operation
and benefit levels can vary widely across cities even within
the same province. Apart from a few very large ones, cities
are too small a budgetary unit to provide sufficient risk pool-
ing to ensure the sustainability of social insurance. The fi-
nancial decentralisation also has an adverse effect on the op-
eration of MLSA, which has to be financed from the gen-
eral revenue of the cities. In many cases, cities with a com-
paratively heavier burden of MLSA have more strained
budgets because the factors that cause households to slip
into poverty also act as a drag on city finances. 
Decentralisation in rural areas runs deeper than in urban
areas. Apart from a few schemes run by the centre or by
provincial governments, most of the rural social security
schemes are organised at the grass roots level of villages.
Such schemes include assistance to poor households and the
rural pensions and co-operative medical insurance schemes.
The initiation, operation and financing of rural schemes
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11. Chinese cities divide into a five-level hierarchy: provincial, sub-provincial, prefecture-
and county-level. All included there are 662 cities and towns. The above figure of 269
excludes 393 county-level cities.
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Setting Up an Integrated Social Security System
largely rest with lower tier governments; the higher govern-
ment tiers (provinces and the centre) in most cases confine
themselves to the supervision and setting-up of pilot
schemes. Associated with this, variations in social security
provision are much wider in rural than in urban areas. 
There are ad hoc transfers from the central and provincial
governments to lower tier governments so they can meet their
social security obligations under social insurance and MLSA.
But there is as yet no regular framework for fiscal transfers
from higher to lower government tiers to cover expenditure
responsibilities of the latter. An overhaul of the system of
inter-governmental finances has been high on the reform
agenda for a number of years but it still remains to be re-
alised. A pooling of social insurance contributions and expen-
ditures at the provincial level is the policy aim. There are 11
or so provinces, including province-level cities, that in various
ways pool contributions and expenditure. But there is as yet
no preferred framework for pooling. The upgrading of the
level of budgeting from cities to provinces for social insurance
can take a number of forms ranging from full integration to
compensatory transfers within a decentralised system. Each
of these has implications for the administrative structure. The
national pooling of social security contributions and expendi-
tures does not seem to be immediately feasible. It would also
be inequitable in that, under the present financing arrange-
ments, poorer provinces would be making transfers to richer
provinces because the latter tend to have a higher ratio of
pensioners to contributors than do the former. Integrated Soc ia l  Secur ity  System
In October 2006 the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, as a part of the plan to establish a harmo-
nious society, resolved to establish by 2020 a social security
system covering both urban and rural populations. Though
not spelt out explicitly, the common assumption is that the
integrated system would provide to the whole population the
same high level of protection that a section of the urban pop-
ulation currently enjoys. The promised system will not only
close the rural-urban gap but also fill the large gaps in cover-
age that mar the present rural and urban systems. The goal
is ambitious and the time allowed to achieve the goal is very
limited. The closing of the rural-urban gap will require a lot
more than simply raising the social security provision in rural
areas to the level in urban areas. The rural-urban distinction
is not confined to the social security field but runs wide and
deep to the institutional structure of the government, public
finances and the provision of social goods such as basic ed-
ucation and healthcare. 
The establishment of an integrated system has to take into
account the implications of the following:
• The rural per capita income is a small fraction of the
urban per capita income. In 2005, the rural net income
per capita was slightly less than one-third of the urban dis-
posable per capita income.
• The variation in rural per capita income is far wider than
that in urban per capita income.
• A large percentage of rural households have a piece of
land each, which historically has served as a justification
for providing restricted social security cover to the rural
population. 
• Internal migrants are huge in numbers and mobile across
localities.
The first suggests that applying the same schedule of con-
tributions and benefits for social insurance schemes to both
rural and urban populations may lead to a much lower par-
ticipation rate among the former. There are two possibilities
for raising the participation rate among the rural population
to that of the urban population. One is to charge rural res-
idents a lower contribution rate in return for lower benefits.
This is the approach used by Shanghai in extending social
insurance to its rural population. It is a temporary solution
to the problem posed by the rural-urban income gap and
cannot be a permanent feature of the integrated scheme.
The other approach is to keep the same schedule of contri-
bution and benefit but raise the government contribution to
offset any financial shortfall caused by the inclusion of the
rural population. This fits in with the spirit of an integrated
social security system. But it is premised on the continued
improvement in public finances as seen over the last few
years. 
The greater variation in income per head in rural localities
than in comparable urban localities suggests a fundamental
incompatibility between an integrated social security system
and the financial and operational decentralisation that char-
acterises the present system. The obverse of decentralisation
is variation in the levels of provision and facilities. Extend-
ing the current system to cover rural localities would further
widen the variation and may make the integrated system
non-viable. The implication is that the construction of an in-
tegrated social security system has to go together with rais-
ing the budgetary unit to the provincial level.
Turning to the land plot as a substitute for social security, the
average area of land plot per household varies across villages
(even in close vicinity) but also according to climate and lo-
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cation. The cultivated area per rural inhabitant is low:
slightly less than one-fifth of a hectare (0.19)((12) and falling,
due to the diverting of land for non-agricultural uses. The im-
plication is that although land plots have reduced the inci-
dence of rural poverty, they do not provide full protection
against fall into poverty. Further, not all rural households
have a land plot and the number of landless households has
in recent years risen sharply. A rough estimate puts their
number at forty million which is around 10% of all rural
households. The argument is that treating household land
plots as a justification for providing the rural population with
a reduced social security cover was weak to begin with and
has been rendered even weaker by recent developments.
There is a strong argument for completely de-linking land
tenure from the development of social security for the rural
population.
Migrants represent a huge blind spot in the current social se-
curity coverage. This is due to two factors. First, because of
the way the hukou system currently operates, migrants con-
tinue to not be treated as residents of a locality where they
have actually been living and working for a long time. Second,
current social security schemes are financed and operated on
a highly decentralised basis and there is as yet no national
framework for the portability of contributions and benefits. 
A vast majority of migrant workers are from rural localities
and their inclusion in the social security system would seem
to be a first step towards the construction of an integrated
system. There are two aspects to the participation of immi-
grants in social insurance schemes: collection of contribu-
tions and disbursement of benefits.
The problems raised by the first are, in principle, the same
for migrants and residents. The only difference is that mi-
grants are more likely to be in jobs, such as casual or infor-
mal employment, with low rates of social insurance cover.
Concerning the second, one needs to distinguish between
schemes where contributions and benefits run concurrently
and where they are separated in time. The former include
disability and injury compensation and medical care insur-
ance, which can be extended to migrant workers without any
problem. Some cities already do this. The latter group in-
clude old-age pensions, which raises a particular problem be-
cause of the long time gap between the payment of contri-
butions and the receipt of benefits, and the absence of a na-
tional framework for the accumulation of contributions paid
in various localities and the portability of pensions. An in-
terim solution to the problem is to set up a special scheme
for migrant workers that is managed by the central govern-
ment.
So what are the prospects for the establishment of an inte-
grated social security system by 2020? We can at least em-
phasize that two of the principal pre-conditions for the devel-
opment of such a system are now present. First, the last few
years have seen a dramatic improvement in public finances
and the trend looks likely to continue. Thus, the implication
is that the government would become increasingly capable of
covering the extra cost of setting up an integrated social se-
curity system. Second, the leadership is strongly committed
to establishing such a system. •
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